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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee

:
:

v.

:

ROBERT KELTON BERRY,

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 20040142-CA

:
INTRODUCTION

On August 30, 2004, Appellant filed his opening brief which contained the
statement of the case, facts, and summary of the arguments. See Appellant's
Opening Brief. On June 14, 2005, this Court ordered supplemental briefing in this
case addressing any effect the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Reyes,
2005 UT 33 (Reyes II), issued on June 7, 2005, had in this matter. As requested
by the Court, Appellant does not address any issues not affected by the Reyes II
opinion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. STATE V. REYES DID NOT AFFECT THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER REVERSAL IS REQUIRED WHERE DEFENSE
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR MISSTATING THE LAW ON
REASONABLE DOUBT .
In Reyes, the supreme court addressed the issues of whether the jury must
be instructed that to return a guilty verdict it must "obviate all reasonable doubt"

and whether a trial court must repeat the jury instructions at the close of the
evidence. See Reyes IL 2005 UT 33 at Tfl. However, Reyes II did not address
whether reversal is required when trial counsel violates the prohibition against
describing "a reasonable doubt [a]s one which 'would govern or control a person
in the more weighty affairs of life

'" State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232

(Utah 1997) (citation omitted) overruled in part by Reyes IL 2005 UT 33.
Therefore, Appellant's issue regarding defense counsel's ineffectiveness in
equating a reasonable doubt to major life decisions is unaffected by Reyes II.
A. State v. Reyes Only Addressed Two of the Three-Part Robertson
Test.
In State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d (Reyes I), this Court held in part
"that the reasonable doubt instruction given the jury in Mr. Reyes's trial failed the
first and third Robertson elements, and it accordingly remanded for a new trial."
Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at f 8 (citing Reyes I, 2004 UT App 8 at ffi[21-22). The
Robertson test required the following:
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof
must obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should
not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an
instruction tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict.
Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not
merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct that a
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."
Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at f7 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citations
omitted)).
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This Court also held "that the trial court erred when it did not repeat the
preliminary jury instructions at the close of the evidence." Reyes II, 2005 UT 33
at TJ9 (citing Reyes I, 2004 UT App 8 at 1124). Therefore, on certiorari the supreme
court addressed only whether a trial court violates "'due process and jury trial
rights'" when the court's reasonable doubt jury instruction does not "utilize the
specific language from Robertson requiring the State to 'obviate all reasonable
doubt,' 'erroneously stated that reasonable doubt is . . . not doubt which is merely
possible'" and whether Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 (g) (6) and due
process were violated by the trial court's failure to reread the preliminary jury
instructions at the close of the evidence. Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at ^f5.
First, the supreme court addressed the Robertson requirement that a trial
court must instruct a jury "that the State's proof must 'obviate all reasonable
doubt.'" Id at ^[25. The court discussed that the '"obviate all reasonable doubt'
test" originated from Justice Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375,
1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Id The court reasoned that the
'"obviate all reasonable doubt' concept appears to derive from a fear that in
ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror
might misapply the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard unless she is required to
search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence." Id The court
found the concept of Justice Stewart's "suggestion that the jury be instructed to
'obviate all reasonable doubt'" "both linguistically opaque and conceptually
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suspect" because "not every jury will confront evidence in its deliberations
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt." Id at ^[26.
The court also found the concept flawed because "it tends to diminish the
degree of proof necessary to convict" and in that regard violates the standard set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1
(1994). Because "'the obviate all reasonable doubt' element of the Robertson test
carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree
of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt," the court "expressly abandoned] it."
Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at 1J30.
Next, the court addressed whether the jury instruction violated the third
element of the Robertson test by 'erroneously stat[ing] that reasonable doubt is . . .
not doubt which is merely possible.' Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at ^[5. The court
pointed out that "neither Justice Stewart's dissent in Ireland nor the Robertson test
it spawned outlawed all references to 'possibilities' in defining reasonable doubt."
Id at ^[32. The court determined that "[w]hen complemented by appropriate
qualifying and explanatory language, the use of the term 'mere possibility' in the
definition of doubt does not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury would
apply an unconstitutionally diminished standard of proof." IdL at ^33. The court
determined that the jury instruction in Reyes excluding doubt which is "'merely
possible'" from consideration, was proper because it was "followed by an
explanatory phrase "effectively neutraliz[ing] the risk that the reference" would
"improperly lead a juror to apply a standard of proof lesser than beyond a
4

reasonable doubt." Id The court concluded that the instruction "appropriately
addressed the concept of 'possibility' in gauging the reasonableness of doubt." Id.
at 134.
After suggesting a jury instruction on reasonable doubt for use by the trial
courts in Utah, the court addressed whether this Court was correct in determining
that it was harmless error for the trial court to fail to reinstruct the jury at the close
of the evidence. Affirming on different grounds, the supreme court determined
from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the trial court's recitation of the
jury instructions, that the trial court complied with Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17 (g) (6), therefore, there was no error. Id at ^42.
Referring to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19, the court concluded that
"[t]he paramount goal that guides the timing of the recitation of an instruction is
jury comprehension." Id. at ^47. The court reasoned that the common objective
of Rule 19 was jury comprehension and the "the means chosen to pursue [that] end
. . . is a grant of expanded flexibility in the content of jury instructions and the
timing of their recitation to the jury." Id. at ^48. Given the impossibility of
harmonizing Rule 19's "pragmatic tone" "with a hidebound interpretation of Rule
17," the court declined to do so. Id The court concluded that given that "less than
twenty-four hours separated the trial court's reading of the preliminary instructions
from the conclusion of evidence" and that "the jury was provided with a written
copy of every instruction," the trial judge was "within the bounds of discretion
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afforded by rule 17 and rule 19" to decline to repeat the jury instructions at the
close of the evidence. Id at ^[49.
Based on the court's conclusions, it "abandoned] Robertson's insistence
that the jury be instructed that to return a guilty verdict it must "'obviate all
reasonable doubts,'" and reversed this Court's holding in Reyes I on that point and
affirmed, on alternative grounds, this Court's holding regarding the "challenge to
the timing of the jury instructions." Id. at ^50.
Because the court's opinion only addressed the first and third element of
the Robertson test and only "expressly abandoned]" the first element requiring
jury instruction to inform jurors that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt,"
and the timing of jury instructions issue, Reyes II does not impact on Appellant's
issue requiring this Court to reverse due to defense counsel's deficient
performance in comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions.1 Id. at ^[30.
B. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective for Comparing a Reasonable
Doubt to Major Life Decisions.
Because Reyes II did not address the second element of the Robertson test
requiring that jurors not be instructed that "a reasonable doubt is one which
'would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life,'" it does not
1

The supreme court recently issued State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, wherein it states
that in Reyes II it had overruled the Robertson test. Id. at Tf21. However, as noted
supra, the Reyes II opinion never directly addressed the second element of the
Robertson test. See generally Reyes II, 2005 UT 33. Similarly, the supreme court
in stating that the Robertson test was overruled did so without addressing the
second element of the test in Cruz. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45. Therefore, the court's
statement is dictum and does not affect Mr. Berry's ineffective assistance claim
issue.
6

affect Appellant's ineffective assistance claim issue. Reyes IL 2005 UT 33. As
argued in Appellant's opening brief, defense counsel was ineffective for
misstating the law on reasonable doubt to the jury by erroneously comparing a
reasonable doubt to major life decisions.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
defendants "the right to . . . have Assistance of counsel for his defense." State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). This right has been held to mean the
"effective assistance of counsel." Id. Utah appellate courts rely on the test
established in Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the
Stickland test, 'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard
of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
trial would have been different" . . . . [I]n making this evaluation, the
court must "indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy."
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, TJ23, 84 P.3d 1183 (citations omitted).
"To prevail on the first prong of the test, a defendant 'must identify specific
acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an
objective standard of reasonableness.'" Robertson, 932 P.2d at ^}24 (citation
omitted). The second element in the Robertson test states that a reasonable doubt
instruction to the jury "should not state that a reasonable doubt is one which
'would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an
7

instruction tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict. Id. at 1232
(quoting State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Stewart, J., dissent)). This well
established law was not at addressed in Reyes, but case law supports that it
remains valid.
In Justice Stewart's dissent in Ireland, he discusses how comparing a
reasonable doubt to weighty decision in a jurors life "tends to diminish and
trivialize the constitutionally required burden-of-proof standard." Ireland, 773
P.2datl381.
Nothing that one ordinarily does in the course of a normal life span
is comparable to the decision to deprive another of either his or her
life or liberty by voting to convict for a crime. Profound differences
exist between decisions to convict another person and decision to
enter into marriage, by a home, invest money, have a child, or have a
medical operation - or whatever else might be deemed a weighty
affair of life.
The mental process employed in deciding that someone has
committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is different from the
mental process employed in making decisions in the "more weighty
affairs of life." In making the latter type decision, a person looks
forward and makes a decision about future conduct. A degree of risk
is always inherent in such a decision, and usually the degree of risk
based on doubt about future events is significant. The process
employed in making such decisions is only partly a matter of
assessment of past facts; instead, the decision often rests on a degree
of hope, determination, and frequently, personal resolve. In most
cases, the decision is revocable, but whether or not revocable, it is at
least salvageable.
A decision to convict always looks backward; it is concerned only
about resolving conflicting versions of factual propositions about a
past event. It is always irrevocable as to the jurors. The process
does not involve the decision maker's hope, determination, or
willingness to undertake a personal risk. Rather, such a decision
demands reason, impartiality, and common sense. A jury must have
8

a greater assurance of the correctness of its decision, if it is to
comply with the constitutional mandate, than the individual jurors
are likely to have in making the "weighty" decisions they confront in
their own lives.
Id; see also Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("[T]here
is a substantial difference between a juror's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt and a person making a judgment in a matter of personal importance to
him.5'); Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 461 N.E.2d 201, 204-09 & n.l (Mass.
1984) (finding error based on instruction including comparisons to decisions
regarding professions, marriage, the home, and surgery).
The concern over this type of "willing to act" analogy has been criticized
by the United States Supreme Court. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 141
(1954) (critizing "willingness to act" language in preference for "hesitate to act"
language). While the majority of the Supreme Court has expressed a preference
for the "hesitate to act" language, Justice Ginsburg identified concerns with this
type of language also. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 24 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Urging for the adoption of the Federal Judicial Center's Pattern
Criminal Jury Instruction 21, Justice Ginsburg quoted a judicial report to the
Judicial Conference of the United States which criticizing the "hesitate to act"
language to point out its problems.
"[T]he analogy it uses seems misplaced. In the decisions people
make in the most important of their own affairs, resolution of
conflicts about past events does not usually play a major role.
Indeed, decisions we make in the most important affairs of our lives
- choosing a spouse, a job, a place to live, and the like - generally
involve a very heavy element of uncertainty and risk-taking. They
9

are wholly unlike the decisions jurors ought to make in criminal
cases."
Id. (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 1819 (1987) (commentary on instruction 21)).
The reasonable doubt instruction urged by Justice Ginsburg for adoption is
the very one our supreme court recommended to our state trial court's for use
because it "winnow[s] out ill-conceived notions of reasonable doubt." Reyes II,
2005UT33atlf36.
As determined by case law, comparing a reasonable doubt to major life
decisions "tends to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required burden-ofproof standard." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381. Due process requires the state to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and when a reasonable doubt is defined to
a jury in a way that leads them to convict on a lower burden-of-proof standard, due
process is violated. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 22. In fact, in analyzing the first
element of the Robertson test, the supreme court's focus was on whether the jury
instruction "tends to diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict." Reyes II,
2005UT33atT[27.
In this case, defense counsel described a reasonable doubt to the jury during
closing arguments by using the following analogy:
And I have talked about how serious these offenses are, and how
important, if not more important, than deciding who you are going to
marry or if you are going to buy a house. That's how careful you
have to be and what factors you would weigh in saying, "Am I going
to marry this person?" And the thing is, in a case like that, with
buying a house or marrying somebody, you can change that
10

decision. You can get a divorce. You can sell your house. But in
this case you cannot.
R. 267:294.
As argued above, the prohibition of using such analogies to describe
reasonable doubt continues to be recognized. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232;
State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Stewart, J., dissent); Scurry v. United
States, 347 F2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In violating this prohibition against
comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions, defense counsel's
performance fell "below an objective standard of reasonableness." Montoya, 2004
UT 5 at f23. Given the well established case law that the use of these types of
analogies tends to diminish the standard of proof necessary to convict, defense
counsel's comparisons cannot be considered sound trial strategy. Id. Therefore,
defense counsel's performance meets the first prong of the Strickland test.
"[B]ut for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different." Id. This was a close case
where Appellant's participation in the aggravated robbery was suspect due to Mr.
Booth's, the complainant, inconsistent testimony regarding many aspects of what
happened during the incident. See Appellant's Opening Brief. For example,
crucial testimony regarding who took what property during the robbery, Mr. Booth
initially testified at the preliminary hearing that after the passenger in the vehicle,
Appellant's brother, pulled out a knife and said "What do you got?" Mr. Booth
gave him "[his] CD player, [his] CD's, everything I had on me, my wallet." R.
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263:9. Later, upon the prosecutor's suggestion of Appellant's involvement, Mr.
Booth testified that the Appellant, the driver, had taken his CD's, and his brother
took the rest. R. 263:12. Mr. Booth also testified during cross-examination that
he was holding his CD's and they were not in the car. R. 263:14-15.
Defense counsel:

You were holding [the CD's], and the driver
took them from you?

Mr. Booth:

No, the passenger took them.

Defense counsel:

The passenger did? OK. So then the driver
didn't take anything from you?

Mr. Booth:

He took the CD's.

Defense counsel:

You just said the passenger took the CD's. Are
you not sure.
I am not sure. I am not sure if they were in the
car or not.

Mr. Booth:
R. 263:15.

On redirect, the prosecutor asked Mr. Booth to take his time and think
about who took what property. R. 263:25. Mr. Booth then testified that "[t]he
passenger took my CD player and my razor. And I heard the driver say, "T am
keeping these,' and took my CD's." R. 263:25. At the first trial, Mr. Booth
testified that Appellant was looking through the CD case and said that he was
keeping them. R. 265:38. At the second trial, Mr. Booth again testified that he
gave Appellant's brother "all [his] stuff. . . [his] CD's, [his] radio, [his] wallet,
everything [he] had." R. 266:99.
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Prosecutor:

You gave all those items to the defendant's younger
brother?

Mr. Booth:

No, not all of them. I gave my CD's and my wallet to
him.

Prosecutor:

Your CD's?

Mr. Booth:

No, my CD player and my wallet. And then I don't
remember where my CD's were. I think they were in
the car.

R. 266:99.
Mr. Booth then stated that Appellant had taken his CD's. R. 266:99.
Specifically, Mr. Booth testified that after Appellant's brother had hit him and
pulled a knife on him and asked for his property, the brother then told Appellant to
give Mr. Booth back his CD's. R. 266:100. However, Appellant allegedly said
that he was keeping them. R. 266:100, 134. This testimony, along with several
other inconsistent statements made by Mr. Booth, made it suspect. Because of
these and other conflicting statements, instructing the jury on the State's correct
burden of proof was crucial.
Defense counsel by using prohibited analogies in describing a reasonable
doubt "diminished or trivialized" the burden of proof and led the jury to believe it
could convict on a lesser standard then required by due process. Because
u

[n]othing that one ordinarily does in the course of a normal life span is

comparable to the decision to deprive another of either his or her life or liberty by
voting to convict for a crime," defense counsel's statements mislead the jury and
resulted in prejudice to the Appellant. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380-82. In a case
13

such as this where the jury must rely solely on the victim's testimony to determine
guilt, misstating the law on the standard required to convict resulted in Appellant
receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. The prejudice suffered by Appellant
required that this Court reverse his conviction.
CONCLUSION
Appellant, Robert Kelton Berry, respectfully requests this Court to reverse
his conviction and remand for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this S^_ day of August, 2005.

<<( fV
DEBRA M. NELSON
Attorney for Appellant
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